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BAR BRIEFS
from the fanaticism of temporary majorities, in respect of matters
that closely affect the life, the conscience and the well-being of the
citizen. What those guarantees are and how they are protected
will be explained in our next number, as space will not permit it in
this one.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Anton J. Kary, vs. N. D. Workmen's Compensation Bureau,
From Morton County.
That the only injury for which an employee may recover com-
pensation from the Workmen's Compensation Bureau under the
Workmen's Compensation Act is one "arising in the course of em-
ployment." (Section 396a2 of the Supplement.)
That Plaintiff was employed by the county in grading and
improving a highway, and furnished horses and his own labor in
driving a grader. After his work had ceased, and at some dist-
ance from his field of labor, he was injured while en route home
on the public highway. Held, plaintiff is not entitled to compen-
sation from defendant for such injury as the injury did not arise
"in the course of employment."
In G. W. Jones Lumber Company, a Corporation, vs. City of Mar-
marth, a Municipal Corporation, From Slope County.
That a judgment against a city for breach of duty, negligence,
and wrongful acts or omission on the part of the city is not such
a debt or indebtedness as is governed by section 18 of the Consti-
tution of this State which provides that the "debt of any * * *
city * * * shall never exceed five per centum upon the assessed
value of the taxable property therein. * * * All bonds and obliga-
tions in excess of the amount of indebtedness permitted by this
Constitution, given by any city, * * * shall be void."
That where a judgment has been rendered against a city on
account of its "negligence or breach of duty in the levy or collec-
tion of * * * special assessments," the city may, under the provis-
ions of chapter 196" of the Session Laws of 1935, compromise and
find such judgment by the issuance of bonds "payable in stat-
ed annual installments over a period of years, not exceeding
twenty-five, and at a rate of interest not exceeding five per cent
per annum", provided that the judgment creditor agrees to a com-
promise of such judgment wherein and whereby at least twenty-
five per cent of the judgment is rebated. In such event, under
the provisions of said-chapter, the city may agree to "levy a direct
annual and irrepealable tax sufficient in amount to pay the prin-
cipal and interest of said bonds as they severally mature."
That such bonds may be issued without reference to the con-
stitutional limitations set forth in section 183 of the State Consti-
tution.
BAR BRIEFS
That the purpose of chapter 196 of the Session Laws of 1935,
is to afford municipalities an optional and alternative method for
the compromise of judgments aihd to "satisfy the same and levy
taxes in amounts necessary for the purpose without respect to
limitations otherwise existing." Hence, the provision in section
3681 of the Compiled Laws, viz., "When any final judgment shall
be obtained against any city within the state of North Dakota, the
city council of such city may by resolution provide for the levy
and collection of an annual tax upon all the taxable property of
such city, not exceeding the amount of ten mills on the dollar in
any one year which shall be used in payment of such judgment"
does not govern such settlement and compromise.
That Chapter 11A of the Code of Civil Procedure, being sec-
tions 7712al to 7712a16 of the Supplement, provides for the entry
of a declatory judgment in order "to settle and to afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and
other legal relations" for any person interested under a written
contract, and to determine "any question of construction or val-
idity arising under the instrument" when there is an actual con-
troversy between the parties to the contract and the controversy
is submitted to a court, in which a judgment may be entered that
will conclusively determine the controversy. The judgment must
be such as will be finally determinative of the issue, and the "con-
tract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof."
That where a judgment against a city has been compromised
under the provisions of chapter 196 of the Session Laws of 1935,
bonds issued therefor, and an irrepealable tax levied by the city
for the purpose of payment thereof, and thereafter the city con-
cludes that the bonds so issued and the tax so levied are invalid as
violating the provisions of Section 183 of the Constitution of this
State, and notifies the holders of the bonds to this effect, and
manifests its intent not to abide by the terms of the compromise,
the holders of the bonds are entitled to a declaratory judgment
to determine the rights and duties of the parties when it is clear
that the judgment entered will finally determine the controversy.
That while, under the provisions of section 3681 of the Comp.
Laws, ordinarily the maximum amount of taxes which a city may
levy for the payment of judgments is ten mills on the dollar of the
assessed valuation regardless of the number or amounts of such
judgments, the fact that subsequent judgments may be rendered
against the city does not require that those who may be entitled
to judgment be made parties to this action for a declaratory judg-
ment as this compromise entered into is not controlled by the pro-
visions of said section 3681 and the only parties concerned in this
controversy are the holders of the bonds and the municipality that
issued them.
BAR BRIEFS
In John Busdicker, vs. Peoples Opinion Printing Company, a
Corporation, From Barnes County.
That where an employee sues for compensation for labor per-
formed under a special contract the employer may recoup damages
for the nonperformance of or a breach of the contract but cannot
recoup damages which he might have prevented by reasonable
diligence.
That where objections to certain questions are sustained and
there is nothing in the record to show that such questions call for
evidence material under the pleadings it was not error to sustain
the objections.
In Charles W. Janneck, vs. Workmen's Compensation Bureau,
From Cass County.
That one of the most important tests to be applied in deter-
mining whether a person who is doing work for another is an em-
ployee or an independent contractor is whether the person for
whom the work is done has the right to control not merely the re-
sult, but the manner in which the work is done and the method
used.
That the evidence is examined and it is held that the plain-
tiff, at the time of his injury, was not an employee of the Weddell
Motor Company, but was working as an independent contractor
and that he is not entitled to compensation from the Workmen's
Compensation Fund.
